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The Internet was not designed with security in mind. A number of recent
protocols such as Encrypted DNS, HTTPS, etc. target encrypting critical
parts of the web architecture, which were previously sent in the clear. IP
addresses still remain visible to on-path observers and can be utilized for cen-
sorship, surveillance and sabotaging user’s privacy on the web. We perform
a measurement study on datasets representative of the state of the Internet
fetched via HTTP Archive or those collected with configurations like Ad-
block enabled vs. disabled over extended periods of time by crawling Alexa’s
top websites to gauge the amount of information leaked by IP addresses. We
build a page load fingerprint for each of the websites crawled and filter the
websites that have uniquely identifying IP addresses mapped to them. We
build a neural network to study how accurately the classifier works in fin-
gerprinting websites based on IP addresses and their respective Autonomous
System Numbers (ASNs). Approximately 80% of the IP addresses have an
anonymity set comprising of a unique website and can successfully identify
it. The classifier performs with an accuracy of about 60% on the remaining
data. We observe that the classifier confuses websites belonging to common
hosting infrastructures. Manual clustering efforts on the data based on these
trends can increase the classification accuracy. We find areas of improve-
ment for the current measurement study and provide suggestions to Content
Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other agents fundamental to the Internet
infrastructure to increase user privacy.
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The web was not designed with security in mind. For most of the Internet’s
history, HTTP Web traffic traveled unencrypted between clients and servers.
After widespread tampering and surveillance in transit came to public atten-
tion (Example [1]), cross-industry efforts arose to promote the use of HTTP
over TLS (HTTPS).
HTTPS ensures that the web has a base level or privacy and integrity [2].
It provides cryptographic security protections by carrying HTTP messages
over the Transport Layer Security protocol instead of directly over TCP [3].
We now see an increased adoption of HTTPS which encrypts the content
being sent over the Internet.
There are other parts of critical web infrastructure that are still being sent
in clear text. Although TLS 1.3 [4] encrypts most of the handshake, including
the server certificate, there are several other channels that allow an on-path
attacker to determine the domain name the client is trying to connect to,
including:
• Clear text Server Name Indication (SNI) [5] in ClientHello messages.
• Clear text client DNS queries.
• Visible server IP addresses, assuming the server is not doing domain-
based virtual hosting [6].
HTTPS utilizes TLS as the underlying protocol. TLS does not provide a
mechanism for a client to tell a server the name of the server it is contact-
ing. It may be desirable for clients to provide this information to facilitate
secure connections to servers that host multiple “virtual” servers at a single
underlying network address [5]. This is facilitated by a field called Server
Name Indication or SNI. SNI enables servers to host multiple TLS-enables
websites on the same IP address. The client can specify the website they
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Figure 1.1: Previously: Most of the HTTP Internet traffic between servers
and clients was sent in clear text. An adversary could, thus, easily gauge
what the user was doing on the Internet. Image courtesy: Prof. Borisov.
want to connect to as a part of the SNI field. Because the SNI field was sent
in plain text for a very long time, it clearly had detrimental privacy impli-
cations and could be easily snooped on by on-path observers like Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), coffee shop owners etc. to know what website the
user was visiting.
Cloudflare announced support for Encrypted Server Name Indication or
ESNI that prevents on-path attackers from snooping on traffic and enhances
user privacy. The server publishes a public key on a well-known DNS record,
which can be fetched by the client before connecting (as it already does for
A, AAAA and other records). The client then replaces the SNI extension in
the ClientHello with an “encrypted SNI” extension, which is none other than
the original SNI extension, but encrypted using a symmetric encryption key
derived using the server’s public key. The server, which owns the private key
and can derive the symmetric encryption key as well, can then decrypt the
extension and therefore terminate the connection (or forward it to a backend
server). Since only the client, and the server it is connecting to, can derive
the encryption key, the encrypted SNI cannot be decrypted and accessed by
third parties [7].
Any request made by a client usually always goes through a DNS or a Do-
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Figure 1.2: Currently: As HTTPS adoption increased, the actual content
being transmitted was encrypted. Other critical parts of the web
infrastructure like the DNS query and Server Name Indication field of TLS
ClientHello Message were still sent in clear revealing lesser information than
before but still enough to profile a user’s activities on the web. Note that
the dotted red boxes mark the part being encrypted. Image courtesy: Prof.
Borisov.
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main Name System Lookup. Typically three different types of DNS requests
are made. The primary request is to the web page being requested by the
user, this is the domain name in the URL that the user typed, selected from
a bookmark, or chosen by clicking on an hyperlink, the secondary requests
are usually made by the user agent or the web browser to fetch the other
resources involved in loading and displaying the page and its embedded con-
tent like cascading style sheets, etc. The tertiary requests are performed by
the DNS system itself. For instance, if the answer to a query is a referral
to a set of name servers, and the glue records are not returned, the resolver
will have to do additional requests to turn the name servers’ names into IP
addresses. Similarly, even if glue records are returned, a careful recursive
server will do tertiary requests to verify the IP addresses of those records [8].
The DNS Requests have been typically sent in clear and all of them have
the potential to leak information to an eavesdropper interested in knowing
what web pages a user is visiting. The DNS request includes many fields, but
two of them seem particularly relevant for the privacy issues: the QNAME
and the source IP address. The QNAME can reveal information about what
the user does while the source IP address, which is the IP address of the
user, is used for communication between the stub resolver and the recursive
resolver. This situation enables entities, such as Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), Autonomous Systems (ASes), or state-level agencies, to perform user
tracking, mass surveillance and censorship. The risk of pervasive surveillance
and its consequences have prompted Internet governance, industry actors,
and standardization bodies to foster privacy protections. In particular, for
DNS, these bodies have standardized two protocols: DNS-over-TLS (DoT)
[9] and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [10]. These protocols encrypt the communi-
cation between the client and the recursive resolver to prevent the inspection
of domain names by network eavesdroppers [11].
While both DNS queries and the TLS SNI extensions can now be protected
by on-path attackers, it might still be possible to determine which websites
users are visiting by simply looking at the destination IP addresses on the
traffic originating from users’ devices [7].
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Figure 1.3: Soon: With newer encryption protocols being rolled out like
ESNI (Encrypted SNI), DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS, the
previously visible parts of the web infrastructure are protected. This leaves
powerful adversaries like Internet Service Providers with access to
destination IP addresses originating from the victim’s machines. Note that





Although encryption can hide the contents of data sent on the Internet,
people often forget that encryption does not hide everything. Somebody
eavesdropping on an encrypted conversation can still tell who is communi-
cating and how much data is being transferred [12]. Censorship is one of the
prevailing concerns associated with web privacy and fingerprinting. If ISPs
and governments are able to block certain websites or perform user profiling,
it clearly impacts user privacy and freedom to use the Internet.
The use of encrypted transports makes it impossible for passive eavesdrop-
pers to observe DNS queries on a shared network, such as a wireless network
in a coffee shop. These transports also allow clients to send encrypted DNS
queries to a third-party recursive resolver (e.g., Google or Cloudflare), pre-
venting a user’s ISP from seeing the DNS queries of its subscribers. As such,
from a privacy perspective, DoT and DoH are attractive protocols, providing
confidentiality guarantees that DNS previously lacked. On the other hand,
encrypted transports introduce new performance costs, including the over-
head associated with TCP and TLS connection establishment, as well as
additional application-layer overhead. DNS queries are typically slower with
encrypted transports but using DoT and DoH can result in faster page load
times compared to using Do53 (Unencrypted DNS queries over port 53) [13].
Siby et al. proposed a novel feature set to perform the fingerprinting attacks
on encrypted DNS traffic, as those used to attack HTTPS or Tor traffic are
not suitable for DNS’ characteristics. They show that traffic analysis enables
the identification of domains with high accuracy in closed and open world
settings, using 124 times less data than attacks on HTTPS flows indicating
that DNS-based censorship is still possible on encrypted DNS traffic [11].
Chai et al. indicated that approximately 10.9% of Alexa [14] Top 1 mil-
lion websites are supporting ESNI. Sixty-six sites can be unblocked because
of ESNI and it increases the cost of blocking 101k sites which means that
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adoption of ESNI is promising and progressive. Their experiment results also
show that 84.5% of the blocked websites are under IP blocking, indicating a
large portion of the websites will remain blocked even when both DNS-based
and SNI-based censorship is circumvented [15].
Zolfaghari et al. stated that censors will refrain from IP blocking the CDN
edge servers that host censored webpages since this will block all the other
(potentially many) non-forbidden webpages hosted on those edge servers as
well [16]. Chai et al. identified 47 blocked IP addresses belonging to Cloud-
flare, which are shared by at least 85 websites suggesting that the censors
are likely to block shared CDN IPs if they are used by a manageable set of
nonforbidden webpages [11].
ISPs are the gatekeepers of not only access to the Internet but also to the
identification of any particular user. By comparing its own IP address logs to
those maintained by the Internet’s web servers, an ISP can readily link online
activity to a specific subscriber account and, potentially, to an individual.
This means that ISPs have the power to obliterate privacy online. Because
an IP address is similar in form to other Personally Identifiable Information
and can be used to identify an individual and their online activity, it should
be protected as Personally Identifiable Information when in the hands of an
ISP or otherwise correlated to personal information about the user [17].
Recent news has reflected backlash from ISPs on opting into DNS Encryp-
tion practices that would make browser data more secure from spying and
inspection and would make monetizing this data and perform web profiling
difficult [18].
Internet traffic relies on the Internet Protocol (IP) to transmit data be-
tween endpoints: each Internet data packet contains an IP source and IP
destination address. Network devices use IP addresses to forward traffic to
Internet endpoints, but at the same time, IP addresses can reveal information
about users and devices and the destinations with which they are commu-
nicating. Thus, even if Internet traffic is encrypted, IP addresses can still
allow eavesdroppers to determine who is communicating with whom. Pre-
vious approaches to obfuscate the IP addresses of the sender and receiver
commonly depend on either custom user software (e.g., Tor browser) [19]
or significant modifications to network hardware along the end-to-end path
(which has proved to be a major roadblock). Datta et al. presented SPINE
that conceals IP addresses and relevant TCP fields from intermediate—and
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potentially adversarial—autonomous systems (ASes) but requires only two
participating ASes and no cooperation from end hosts [20].
Hoang et al. aim to quantify the potential improvement to user privacy
that a full deployment of DoH/DoT and ESNI would achieve in practice,
given that destination IP addresses still remain visible to on-path observers.
They state that it is straightforward to reveal a user’s visited site if the desti-
nation IP address hosts only that particular domain, when a given destination
IP address serves multiple domains, an adversary will have to “guess” which
domain is being visited. They use the k-anonymity property and the dynam-
ics of hosting IP addresses for performing their study. They find that 20% of
the domains studied will not gain any privacy benefit since they have a one-
to-one mapping between their hostname and IP address and that 30% will
gain a high level of privacy benefit with a k value greater than 100, meaning
that an adversary can correctly guess these domains with a probability less
than 1%. Domains whose visitors will gain a high privacy level are far less
popular, while visitors of popular sites will gain much less. Analyzing the
dynamics of IP addresses of long-lived domains indicate that only 7.7% of
them change their hosting IP addresses on a daily basis [21].
Our previous work looked at the top 1 million websites that belonged to
Alexa Top 1 Million list [14] to perform an address-based website fingerprint-
ing attack to identify the target of a page load by examining its page load
fingerprint or PLF. The addresses associated with connections made or used
while fetching subresources for a webpage constitute a “page load finger-
print” (PLF). Each subresource connection is associated with one or more
IP addresses, each of which in turn is associated with an Autonomous System
(AS). We found that nearly half of all IPs involved in the crawl corresponded
to a unique domain name, and over 95% of sites had a unique set of IPs
corresponding to the domains of all the subresources [22].
Trevisan et al. focus on the question of whether basic traffic features can
be used to differentiate traffic of major web services with the ambitious goal
to understand how feasible the classification of web services traffic based
only on server IP addresses and queries to the DNS, i.e., the few features
that are likely going to remain visible would be [23]. They stated that up to
65% of the IP addresses are associate to a single hostname. Those servers
however are responsible for less than 15% of web traffic volume. Their results
show that a very simple classifier that relies only on server IP addresses and
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on lists of hostnames can distinguish up to 55% of the traffic volume by
uncovering and aggregating the various hostnames related to a given service,
and then enumerating corresponding IP addresses. Yet, collisions of names
and addresses are common among popular services, calling for more ingenuity.
With encryption protocols like DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS being
rolled out, DNS features would not remain as visible as the previous clear
text transmissions.
This thesis looks at how successful IP addresses alone are in classifying
websites in a closed world setting over a dataset that is collected across a
longer time span with greater variability unlike the Trevisan et al. work. It
also expands on the previous results from “What can you learn from an IP
address?” to test the measurement study results on the data fetched from the
HTTP Archive [24] database. To build a web-fingerprinting attack model, it
looks into building a classifier that given a page load fingerprint, can identify
what website the user accessed. Using MIDA [25], a highly configurable web
crawler based on Chromium, it fetches more extensive datasets for major
websites over months to study the classification and also analyze the effects
of having an Adblocker enabled versus not to see how the results translate





1. MIDA Web Crawler : MIDA is a highly configurable web crawler built
on top of Chromium and the Chrome DevTools Protocol [25] developed
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. We use MIDA
to direct the Chrome browser to crawl websites from Alexa’s Top 1
million list [14] and get information associated with these requests,
which includes an in-depth summary of the browser metadata, resource
information, details about sub-query URLs, resources hosted, response
headers, response remote IP address etc. All these crawls are performed
from 10 unique IPs belonging to the same subnet (Figure 3.1).
(a) MIDA Dataset 1: We crawled Alexa’s top 1000 websites using the
Chrome browser without an Adblocker enabled at the rate of one
crawl per day for each of the websites with contiguous runs in
May 2019 and June 2019 followed by a contiguous run from July
9, 2019 to October 1, 2019.
(b) MIDA Dataset 2: We crawled a total of major 4k websites from
Figure 3.1: The table compares the different MIDA datasets used in this
study.
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Alexa’s top 1 million at the rate of three or more crawls per day
per website from February 3, 2020 to February 25, 2020 without
Adblocker enabled.
(c) MIDA Dataset 3: We crawled a total of major 4k websites from
Alexa’s top 1 million at the rate of three or more crawls per day
per website from February 26, 2020 to March 26, 2020 with and
without Adblocker Ghostry enabled to compare the distinctions
between the sets in the presence and absence of an Adblocker.
2. HTTP Archive: HTTP Archive is an open source project that tracks
how the web is built by crawling the top sites on the web and recording
detailed information about fetched resources, used web platform APIs
and features, and execution traces of each page [24]. The data obtained
from these crawls can be accessed and analyzed using Google BigQuery
on the Google Cloud Platform. We have built a data pipeline to fetch
a view of this data from the public dataset’s monthly snapshots and
have further queried it to procure meaningful insights. The data is
gathered on the first day of each month using their private instance
of the WebPageTest on Chrome for desktop and emulated Android
(on Chrome) for mobile. The test agents are located in the Internet
Systems Consortium data center in Redwood City, CA. Each URL is
loaded three times with an empty cache (“first view”) [24]. We look
at the summary requests and summary pages tables from July 2019 to
February 2020 for our page load fingerprint generation.
3.2 Why the Several Datasets?
The advantage of having crawls that span over a period of time can help us
gauge how much data an adversary needs to collect to perform some kind of
data analytics on the users’ activity in their network to profile the victims.
Utilizing data from various vantage points adds variability in the data source
and helps validate the result trends. We can also see how the subqueries
associated with each of these websites and thereby, the domains accessed by
them vary over time. We analyzed trends across the datasets that we studied
to create such visualizations for the first 50 websites belonging to Alexa’s top
11
Figure 3.2: The figure depicts the fraction of the page loads that have a
particular domain in it. The Y-axis has the domains listed while the X-axis
depicts the fraction. We notice that some domains are present in all the
page loads. Usually this has the front page domain as well.
1 million websites in each of the datasets to see how the domain sets vary
over time. Figure 3.3 shows how the set grows for bbc.com. There are some
other websites for which the domain set remains relatively static as seen in
Figure 3.4. We also visualize the number of page load fingerprints that have
a given domain in it over time as depicted in Figure 3.2.
3.3 Data Variation Comparison with Adblock Enabled
Content and services which are offered for free on the Internet are primarily
monetized through online advertisement. This business model relies on the
implicit agreement between content providers and users where viewing ads is
the price for the “free” content. This status quo is not acceptable to all users,
however, as manifested by the rise of ad-blocking plugins which are available
for all popular Web browsers [26]. To Web users, online advertisements can
be perceived as being not only invasive to privacy, but also annoying, since
they can distract them from the primary content they wish to consume.
This situation has resulted in a proliferation of tools to evade or block the
ads. We refer to these tools as adblockers. Among the most convenient and
popular adblockers are extensions for Web browsers like Adblock Plus and
Ghostery [26]. We use Ghostry as the adblocker that is enabled as a part of
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Figure 3.3: The figure shows a cumulative distribution function of how the
domain set consisting of all the distinct domains seen so far in the crawls
grows over time for bbc.com. The Y-axis has the dates over which the
crawls were conducted and the X-axis depicts the domain set size observed
over time as it grows.
Figure 3.4: The figure shows that the domain set for netflix.com as
observed over time remains static unlike that of bbc.com and other such
websites. The y-axis has the dates over which the crawls were conducted
and the X-axis depicts the domain set size observed over time.
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Figure 3.5: The figure shows that the domain set for bbc.com as observed
over time with adblock enabled. The Y-axis has the dates over which the
crawls were conducted and the X-axis depicts the domain set size observed
over time. The cumulative domain size is 49 which is significantly lesser
than that observed with adblock disabled.
the configuration settings of the MIDA web crawler for these runs. It helps
emulate a more realistic scenario wherein users might resort to an Adblock-
enabled web browsing experience. MIDA Dataset 3 is composed of websites
crawled over the same period of time with approximately the same crawl
attempts per day per website with adblocker enabled and disabled to get a
variable dataset that can be used to perform a comparison visualization of
domains observed and those restricted by the adblocker plugin. We can notice
that the domain set size decreases significantly when the adblocker is enabled
versus when the adblocker is disabled. We can see how this impacts an
adversary’s web fingerprinting attempts in the later sections. The cumulative
domain set size with adblocker enabled for bbc.com is 49 (Figure 3.5) while
that with the adblocker disabled is 163 as can be seen in Figure 3.6. Figure
3.7 shows what fraction of PLFs have a particular domain in it. We had
the adblocker disabled for this run. Figure 3.8 shows what fraction of PLFs
have a particular domain in it but has lesser domains present in the dataset
because of the adblocker enabled.
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Figure 3.6: The figure shows that the domain set for bbc.com as observed
over time with adblock disabled. The Y-axis has the dates over which the
crawls were conducted and the X-axis depicts the domain set size observed
over time. The cumulative domain size is 163.
Figure 3.7: The figure depicts the fraction of the page loads for bbc.com
that have a particular domain in it. Here we have the adblock disabled.
The Y-axis has the domains listed while the X-axis depicts the fraction.
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Figure 3.8: The figure depicts the fraction of the page loads for bbc.com
that have a particular domain in it. Here we have the adblock enabled and
thus we observe lesser domains than the case when adblock is disabled.
Most of the static domains are still present like the front page domain that
is present in all of the page loads observed. The Y-axis has the domains




4.1 HTTP Archive Cloud Data Pipeline
• Domain2ip Table: This is a table that gets populated and is perpetually
maintained across all of the crawls which holds information about all
the distinct domains seen in the crawls so far and the IP addresses that
each of these domains resolves to, using a high-performance bulk DNS
resolution tool called ZDNS [27].
• We query the summary requests and summary pages tables from the
HTTP Archive database to create a join on them to get the mapping of
the site accessed, the URLs loaded for these sites and the resource types
hosted on these, CDNs present (if any) and we retrieve information for
two more columns - LoadDomain and SiteDomain that keep track of
the domains associated with the respective URLs. This is done by
extracting the host from the URLs that are fetched from the tables.
• We then fetch the list of distinct domains from both the site and load
domains set that are not present in the domain2ip table and stream
these from the BigQuery tables to be fed into the ZDNS resolver to
obtain the IP address resolutions for these domains in an asynchronous
design.
• The domain to IP mappings are then batched and streamed to the
domain2ip table using a streaming buffer interface call to the table to
append the new entries to the table.
• Because most of the processing is handled on the Google Cloud Plat-
form itself, the major processing latency is contributed to by the ZDNS
resolver which we use in an iterative mode with three retries performing
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local queries on the data fetched from Google Cloud Platform (GCP).
We have noticed that out of 7219751 distinct domains processed across
all the monthly snapshots, 430080 failed upon resolution indicating a
success rate of approximately 94.04% which is fairly reasonable for our
Page Load fingerprint analysis. Unlike the MIDA dataset, we do not
limit this data to the top websites from the Alexa list but use it as is.
• This data processing pipeline is open sourced and can be used to create
extended domain to IP address mappings. The table can be utilized as
is as well. Refer to Figure 4.1 for a visualization of the data processing
pipeline.
4.2 MIDA Data Pipeline
• The data collected from the MIDA crawls is parsed to retrieve the
required fields like request ID, site URL, sub query load URL, load do-
main, Type, MimeType, remote IP address from the response data and
another JSON is created. The processing is done using a multithreaded
infrastructure to ensure faster processing of data.
• We then analyze the data by obtaining a cumulative distribution of
how the set of domains grows over time.
• We also analyze how the domains are distributed across the pageload
fingerprints of each site to see how consistent these PLFs are over time.
• These visualizations are built for the websites that belong to top 50 in
Alexa’s top 1 million list.
• The infrastructure for parsing and visualization is in Golang and adopts
a scalable parallel design.
The access to the development scripts is available in the git repository [28].
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Figure 4.1: This figure indicates the Dataflow pipeline adopted on the
Google Cloud Platform for maintaining a mapping of domains to IP





Destination IP addresses originating from the traffic belonging to a victim
that are visible to powerful adversaries like the ISPs can leak information
about the victim’s web activities and can have serious privacy implications.
The IP addresses belonging to a particular website can be grouped together
to create a page load fingerprint associated with that website. The number
of sites that belong to a particular IP address indicate the anonymity set
size of that IP address. If there are IP addresses that uniquely identify a
particular website, i.e. the IP address has an anonymity set size of 1, then
they can be used to identify the website contacted. Apart from that, the
page load fingerprint can be used to identify the remaining websites with
a decent accuracy through some machine learning classification approaches.
Thus, if IP addresses can leak out identifying information, that helps assess
privacy benefits of encryption in critical parts of the web infrastructure.
5.2 HTTP Archive Dataset
The previous work published at the Advanced Networking Research Work-
shop indicated that IP addresses can leak out information about the websites
accessed to a great extent. Using a crawl of Alexa top 1 million sites, we
find that nearly half of all IPs involved in the crawl correspond to a unique
domain name, and over 95% of sites have a unique set of IPs corresponding
to the domains of all the sub-resources [22].
We perform a similar analysis on the HTTP Archive data parsed and
compiled with ZDNS IP mapping for snapshots from July 2019 to February
20
Figure 5.1: This figure shows the resource statistics observed across all the
crawls from the HTTP Archive dataset. Table analyzed is the name of the
table from the HTTP archive database and the other aggregate queries are
performed on the generated after the join using the BigQuery interface.
2020. We notice the trends as indicated in Figure 5.1.
We also aggregated the results across all the tables crawled to build a
perpetual domain to IP address mapping table. Of a total of 6789671 looked-
up domains, we noticed 2011834 distinct IP addresses and an average of
1.4798 average IP addresses per domain. There were 1301151 IP addresses
with an anonymity set size of 1 while the average anonymity set size is
4.9863. The average time run all the analysis queries on the BigQuery Tables
using the pipelines Google Cloud Platform architecture is 2 minutes 28.7358
seconds.
5.3 MIDA Datasets
We perform similar analysis on the datasets collected from the MIDA crawls.
We have a mapping of sites to the date on which the websites were crawled,
mapped further to the IP addresses that the response pages were fetched
from. We build the set of IP addresses associated with each of the front page
websites and also keep track of all the IP addresses that have a front page
anonymity set of size 1 so that they can uniquely identify this website.
Data Trends and Filtering
Any IP address that has an anonymity set size of 1 can be used to uniquely
identify the website that was contacted and this can have an adverse effect
on the users’ privacy.
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MIDA Dataset has 974 unique sites from the original data. We then per-
form two filtering passes on this data. We eliminate the IP addresses that
occur less than 20 times in the entire dataset. This is done in order to reduce
the categorical explosion associated with the number of IP addresses in the
set. We then filter out all the IP addresses that have an anonymity set size of
1 because this can be used to uniquely identify the sites and it also prevents
data over-fitting. After the two passes, we are left with 192 unique sites
which indicates that approximately 80% of the IP addresses can contribute
to a concerning privacy implication by uniquely fingerprinting the website
accessed.
MIDA Dataset 2 has 3620 unique sites from the original data. After per-
forming similar filtering passes as that on the Dataset 1, all the IP addresses
that occur less than 20 times in the entire dataset and those which can
uniquely identify a given site because they map to a single site, are filtered
out. Post-filtering, the set of unique sites comprises of 923 unique sites.
There are 14291 unique IP addresses after the filtering stage. This means
that the categorical data encoding vector is very large and this might lead
to the classifier witnessing the curse of dimensionality. Thus, apart from
using the vector bitmap for IP addresses, we also map the IP addresses to
their Autonomous System Numbers or ASNs, to be explored in the following
section.
We are left with 20% of data that we decide to test a neural network on
in order to gauge how much information can be inferred from this IP based
fingerprinting approach.
Feature Engineering and Parameters
The classifier has to work in a closed world setting on the current dataset.
We start with bitmap vector of all unique IP addresses in the filtered dataset.
Dataset 1 has a bitmap for a total of 9760 unique IP addresses while
Dataset 2 has a bitmap for a total of 14291 unique IP addresses. For each
of the sites in the dataset, we create a corresponding input bitmap the IP
addresses present in the site’s IPset set as 1. The labels are the sites corre-
sponding to each of the bitmaps.
The data is then shuffled and randomly split into an 80-20 training and
test set. The data is batched and fed into a neural net with an embedding
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layer of 400 parameters. The model is trained over a total of 10 epochs at an
empirically tested learning rate of 0.5. We tried a couple different learning
rates to get the one that fetches the best accuracy. We observed that a very
low learning rate for 10 epochs does not yield as high an accuracy as the
above learning rate. It is probably because of the categorical nature of data
in the given datasets.
The output vector corresponds to the set of unique sites and is of the size
192. We perform an argmax operation to get the site predicted with the
highest probability and get the accuracy of the trained model on the test set
by comparing the categories predicted versus the ground truth label from the
dataset. We generate the confusion matrix and analyze it in the sections that
follow. Figure 5.2 shows the pipeline adopted for the classification procedure
for fingerprinting the websites with the IP addresses provided.
5.4 Fingerprinting with ASNs
Creating an encoded vector of IP addresses can suffer from categorical ex-
plosion of data. We experimented with mapping these IP addresses to their
respective Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to get a general sense of
the data and how this can be used for fingerprinting the websites accessed
by the users. The approach is similar to the one mentioned above.
In Dataset 1, the 9760 unique IP addresses map to a total of 346 unique
ASNs. In Dataset 2, the IP address set of 14291 unique IP addresses gets
mapped to a set of 434 ASNs. Although this does involve loss of information,
it provides a more versatile set for a high-level overview of the data. The
ASN set corresponding to each site is encoded into a bitmap vector. The
data is shuffled and split into test and train sets to perform a similar analysis
as above. We use the learning rate of 0.5 coupled with 10 epochs. The idea
is to see how some information loss by IP to ASN mapping compares to the
reduced input vector cardinality.
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5.5 Adblock Configured Datasets
We perform similar feature engineering, data encoding and engineering for
MIDA Dataset 3 to see how a dataset that emulates a more realistic use
case can be used for fingerprinting as compared to another dataset with




















































































































































The neural network fetches an accuracy of 59% on the IP address classifier
and an accuracy of 46% on the Autonomous System Number classifier for
Dataset 1 (Figure 6.1). This was expected because information loss occurs
when we map the set of IPs to the ASNs.
Figure 6.2 shows a normalized confusion matrix from the IP classifier of
Dataset 1. We observe that the false positives have an interesting pattern
by comparing the probabilities of the top five labels predicted for each of the
sites and the sets of true labels versus the predicted labels. We observed that
most of the predicted labels belonged to either the same hosting architecture
or the high-level domain of the website. We further filtered the output site set
by clustering these labels based on these observed trends. Figure 6.3 depicts
the manual clustering example based on the neural network’s predictions.
Figure 6.4 showcases a sample of the prediction trends across the datasets.
After clustering the data based on the inference from the first pass, we
performed another classification experiment on it. The size of the output
set reduced from 192 unique sites to 125 unique site labels for Dataset 1.
The hyper-parameters for the experiment were the same as the previous run.
The IP classifier for Dataset 1 performed significantly better with an accuracy
of 89% while the ASN classifier performed with an accuracy of 79%. The
confusion matrix for the second classification indicates more true positives
because of the clustering efforts as in shown in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6.
Most of the manual clustering was based on the high-level domain present
in the dataset. We adopted a similar approach for the Dataset 2. The
dataset fetched an accuracy of 70% on the IP classifier and an accuracy of
56% on the ASN classifier before clustering. We analyzed the data after
the first classification run and performed manual clustering for the output
set. The set of unique sites reduced from 923 sites before clustering to 843
unique labels after. On training the model again on this dataset, we get to
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Figure 6.1: The figure shows the confusion matrix generated after running
the ASN classifier on Dataset 1. We can observe a diffused patch of the
sites being confused as others.
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Figure 6.2: The figure shows the confusion matrix generated after running
the IP address classifier on Dataset 1. We can observe a diffused patch of
the sites being confused as others.
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Figure 6.3: The manual clustering of a sample of the websites after the first
classification attempt on the MIDA datasets based on the neural network’s
confusion matrix labels and output vector probabilities.
Figure 6.4: A sample of the top 5 websites predicted by the neural net per
actual label after the first classification.
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Figure 6.5: We observe the false positives from the first classification run
and group the websites belonging to the same hosting infrastructure that
the network got confused over as per the confusion matrix generated. The
figure shows the confusion matrix generated after running the IP address
classifier on Dataset 1 after clustering. We observe a more prominent
diagonal indicating more true positives.
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Figure 6.6: We observe the false positives from the first classification run
and group the websites belonging to the same hosting infrastructure that
the network got confused over as per the confusion matrix generated. The
figure shows the confusion matrix generated after running the ASN
classifier on Dataset 1 after clustering. We observe a more prominent
diagonal indicating more true positives.
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Figure 6.7: The figure shows the confusion matrix generated after running
the IP address classifier on Dataset 2. The diagonal is faint and there are
patches indicating some sites were confused.
see an increase in the accuracy to 75% on the IP classifier and an increase
to 62% on the ASN classifier. We make sure that the manual clustering
only accounts for the sites that were mostly confused by the observations
from the confusion matrix. Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 show the classification
results prior to clustering. The diffused square is majorly contributed by the
classifier getting confused between the sites that belong to different google
hosts. Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10 show a darker diagonal which implies that
there were more true positives in this classification.
For Dataset 3, we observed the results as indicated in Figure 6.11 and Fig-
ure 6.12. We notice that the adblocker enabled dataset has a reduced PLF
per site which indicates lesser information and thus we see lesser accuracy
for website fingerprintability. We also notice that the clustering approach
needs to be extended for this dataset because of the wider set of sites ana-
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Figure 6.8: The figure shows the confusion matrix generated after running
the ASN classifier on Dataset 2. The diagonal is faint and there are patches
indicating some sites were confused.
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Figure 6.9: We observe the false positives from the first classification run
and group the websites belonging to the same hosting infrastructure that
the network got confused over as per the confusion matrix generated. The
figure shows the confusion matrix generated after running the IP address
classifier on Dataset 2 after clustering. We observe a more prominent
diagonal indicating more true positives.
34
Figure 6.10: We observe the false positives from the first classification run
and group the websites belonging to the same hosting infrastructure that
the network got confused over as per the confusion matrix generated. The
figure shows the confusion matrix generated after running the ASN
classifier on Dataset 2 after clustering. We observe a more prominent
diagonal indicating more true positives.
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Figure 6.11: The figure shows how the statistics across the adblock enabled
and disabled datasets compare for one of the runs.
lyzed thus the post clustering accuracies are not necessarily providing better
fingerprintability. One factor that contributes to this varied trend is the fact
that the data samples are shuffled and randomly split into train and test
sets. This can mean that the training set might see websites not present in
the test set and vice versa. Thus this can affect the accuracies of detection
seen.
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Figure 6.12: The figure shows how the statistics across the adblock enabled




7.1 What Safeguards Us?
HTTP/2 Connection coalescing means that the browser tries to determine
which of the remote hosts that it can reach over the same TCP connec-
tion. HTTP/2 is only ever used over HTTPS by browsers, so for each origin
speaking HTTP/2, there is also a corresponding server certificate with a list
of names or a wildcard pattern for which that server is authorized to respond
for [29]. Different browsers have different approaches toward it. Firefox
adopts an aggressive coalescing method wherein if there is an overlap in the
list of IP addresses returned for two of hosts and if one of the hosts has
already stated that it is authoritative for the other host, then its connection
is reused. Chrome will reuse the connection to the first host if resolving the
second host returns a list that contains the specific IP of the connection first
host is already using. Edge and Safari do not do coalescing. When a user
visits a website, only a subset of the addresses in the PLF will be contacted,
since some domains resolve to multiple IP addresses, only one of which will
be chosen, and some resources may be cached at the client. (Additionally,
connection coalescing may reduce the number of contacted IPs). As a re-
sult, the fingerprintability of each individual visit to a site may vary. Even
if two sites, A and B, have different PLFs, it is possible that a visit to A will
produce a set of IPs that matches the PLF for B. However, the difference in
PLFs means that it is possible that some visit can be mapped to only one of
the two sites [22].
CDNs can offer additional protection by coalescing more domains onto the
same IP address [22]. That way, the anonymity set of each IP address is
bigger than one and each IP is not uniquely identifiable.
Round-robin DNS is a load balancing technique where the balancing is
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done by a type of DNS server called an authoritative nameserver, rather
than using a dedicated piece of load-balancing hardware. Round-robin DNS
can be used when a website or service has their content hosted on several
redundant web servers; when the DNS authoritative nameserver is queried for
an IP address, the server hands out a different address each time, operating
on a rotation. This is particularly useful when the redundant web servers
are geographically separated, making traditional load-balancing difficult [30].
We noticed DNS round robin’s effects in certain IP addresses being returned
in a rotational fashion for some of the domains in our HTTP Archive dataset.
The variation in the IP addresses returned also contributes to a variable PLF
per website which can affect website fingerprintability.
7.2 Limitations
The current study looks at a subset of websites belonging to the Alexa
top 1 million list. This is a closed world measurement study and thus the
anonymity set size per IP address may actually grow as more websites and
domains are added to the analyzed dataset but if there are uniquely identi-
fiable IP addresses or PLFs, then websites can still be fingerprinted.
Web Cloaking is a commonly employed technique used by scammers to in-
crease their website exposure particularly through search engine optimization
(SEO) and search engine marketing (SEM). Cloaking hides the true nature
of a website by delivering blatantly different content to users versus web
crawlers. It has been widely employed to hide the true nature of websites,
because of its low setup cost and the lack of effective and efficient detection
methods used against it. While search operators try to identify and remove
pages that host harmful content (e.g. phishing pages, malware sites, etc.),
scammers seek to elude such detection using cloaking. Typically, a cloaker
serves “benign” content to crawlers and scam content to normal users who
are referred via a particular search request [31]. Some crawlers make no effort
to obfuscate the IP addresses ranges they appear from. This allows cloaking
services to enumerate the set of bot IPs [32]. Some cloakers employ reverse
DNS techniques to detect crawlers that appear from non-blacklisted IP lists.
Well-behaving search and advertisement crawlers announce their presence
with specialized User-Agent strings commonly advertised on the operator’s
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website. The cloaking services also carve out generic exceptions for crawler
and spider to trigger cloaking logic. Timing-based cloaking prohibits visitors
from accessing uncloaked content more than once in a specific time window
[32]. We use a web crawler to perform our repeated scans. How extensive
the dataset depends on whether certain websites display limited content to
the crawler versus a user by waiting for certain events like user clicks, or user
identifying cookies.
We use the HTTP archive data to get a holistic view of the web and to
develop an extensible domain to IP address mapping pipeline. It also provides
insights into the resources hosted at these domains. This data is useful to
know what the anonymity set sizes for the IP addresses are and how many
of them are capable of uniquely identifying websites. The MIDA dataset
is collected from 10 unique IPs belonging to the same subnet. Although it
helps assess privacy benefits of encryption protocols in the given dataset, this
dataset can be extended to several vantage points to get a more holistic view
of the set of IP addresses returned.
7.3 Future Work
We can expand the measurement study to see how the web fingerprintability
is affected if the front page is ignored and rest of the content is used for iden-
tification purposes. This can be an emulation of the situation wherein the
front page content is hosted on a CDN. The study can also be expanded with
extensive datasets that account for several vantage points. Another curious
experiment can look into how coalescing resource pages into a single connec-
tion can result in a limited set of IP addresses returned, thereby studying a




After studying myriad datasets, we realize that approximately 80% of the
websites had uniquely identifying IP addresses. Our web fingerprinting clas-
sifier was able to classify and find sources of confusion for a significant chunk
of the remaining websites. We can also observe that for most websites, do-
main sets grow over time because of changing dynamic content but a signif-
icant number of these domains are present in almost all page loads. We also
conduct web fingerprinting measurement comparison for an adblock enabled
versus disabled situation and notice that, although the number of websites
classified correctly based on IP addresses is lesser as compared to the non-
adblock configuration because of a reduced page load fingerprint per website,
the detection rate is still promising to have detrimental privacy implications.
Thus, from a privacy standpoint, the newer encryption protocols may not
be enough to guarantee user privacy and prevent web profiling but several
mechanisms and architectural design changes can help enhance web privacy.
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